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But Consciousness Isn't Everything 
The Spring 1994 issue of Cross Currents included an article by Nor­
man Lillegard entitled, "No Good News for DATA/' The reference, of 
course, is to the android of Star Trek: Next Generation fame. I'm quite 
fond of Commander Data, myself. He moves me to struggle to be more 
human, just because becoming more human is his life project. Profes­
sor Lillegard, however, refers to Data as "it." In fact, I appear to be a 
member of the cultural hordes Lillegard thinks have sold their distinc­
tively human birthright in a pathetic attempt to latch onto the latest 
and greatest in technology to explain themselves to themselves. We are 
like complex plumbing one century, clocks and steam engines in an­
other, computers and androids in our own time. So we say to ourselves, 
anyway, and not without some pride and amazement — though our en-
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thusiasm for each model is as short-lived as its stay on the cutting edge 
of technology. 
Lillegard doesn't think this trend of superseded analogies is about to 
be brought to an end by the latest model for wondrous human being: 
an android. On the contrary, he wants to remind us that we humans are 
not so easy to model. Lillegard's title expresses this compactly: the good 
news of the Christian gospel does not apply to any of the technological 
self-images with which we develop passing infatuations. 
Nice point. Lillegard's list of hopelessly inept, yet popular, models 
of human persons supports his gem of wisdom. He strikes a blow for 
human uniqueness, and debunks one more infatuation with a model 
seriously ill-suited for the service into which we press it. I can live with 
that. I'll be sad to look upon Data as even more of a misleading literary 
fiction than I had thought, but glad to be assured of my importance in 
the limited sense that I resist modeling. 
More than this, however, Lillegard offers an argument that a whole 
class of models for human persons are too seriously flawed to be of 
much use. This amounts to a prediction that Data's future literary and 
scientific progeny will do no better as models than Data himself (itself). 
The models Lillegard is aiming at all espouse functionalist theories of 
mind. That is — and Lillegard might have been clearer about this — 
they tell a causal story about how mental states relate to sensory inputs, 
behavioral outputs, and other mental states, in such a way as to avoid 
having to worry about some of the trickier aspects of mental states, such 
as how they might feel to the being whose they are. 
Lillegard argues that such functional stories are contaminated by a 
kind of residual dualism, since there is always the possibility of trans-
ferring all of those causal relationships from a brain to, say, a traditional 
computer, a neural net, a Hoyle-like black cloud, or something else. 
This is uncontroversial, and is why the view is sometimes described 
as "black box functionalism" — the physical substrate for the causal 
relations is needed, but not essential in its specifics. The essence of 
the human person, for this (Lillegard's) kind of functionalism, is the 
transferable pattern of causal relationships. The physical substrate on 
which it depends for its realization is contingent, because it can be ex-
changed in principle for some other physical substrate without loss of 
information or function. 
Now why would Lillegard complain about such a view of the essence 
of the human person? Well, ask yourself, would you think of yourself as 
essentially the same person after your causal, functional relationships 
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had been implemented in another body or, worse from Lillegard's point 
of view, in Data's android substrate? Maybe you would. More pity you, 
then, according to Lillegard, because the uniqueness of you is expressed 
in the concrete, bodily realization of your potential, in the actual nexus 
of particular bodily threats, agonies, and aspirations that you are. All 
of this includes your body, as well as your mental states; both are es-
sential, and probably finally indivisible. Lillegard's conviction in this 
regard is informed by the biblical perspective that human essence is 
always embodied soul, a perspective that he expounds with some care. 
While Professor Lillegard makes some fine points in his essay, he also 
leaves himself vulnerable to criticism. Professor Sennett makes those 
criticisms precisely and judiciously in his enjoyable "Requiem for an 
Android: Response to Lillegard." It is just because of this contention 
that the editors of Cross Currents asked me to write these remarks. Now, 
because this note appears in the same issue as Sennett's article, there is 
no need to summarize his reply. Instead I will do what I hope is most 
useful: evaluate Sennett's criticisms. 
Sennett is evidently a well-trained philosopher of religion of the ana-
lytical persuasion, and we should be appreciative of the clear criticisms 
that his competence engenders. But we should also remain wary of 
one of the potential weaknesses of detailed criticism, namely, that it 
can obscure on the large scale even as it illumines on the small scale. 
For example, it is crucial to ask whether Lillegard's position can be 
reexpressed so as to avoid the worst of Sennett's criticisms while re-
maining true to Lillegard's own central insights. If Lillegard's argument 
could not be reexpressed in this way, then I could perhaps enjoy Com-
mander Data with less ambivalence, thanking Sennett for delivering 
me from the clutches of Lillegard's unjustifiable obsession with human 
uniqueness. But if Lillegard's argument can be reexpressed, then we 
might be forced to conclude that Sennett's incisive prosecution doesn't 
amount to much after all, being useful only to help Lillegard tidy up 
some loose ends and improve the focus of his case. 
To my way of thinking, Sennett scores hits with most of his detailed 
criticisms. However, because his initial characterization of Lillegard's 
article half misses the backbone of the argument, it is not so difficult for 
Lillegard to apply a few bandages to a partially sound structure, make 
a few adjustments here and there to avoid cheap hits in the future, and 
then proclaim that he is ready to fight another day. 
From my earlier exposition of Lillegard's case, it follows that I would 
schematize it differently than Sennett does: 
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1. The character Data conforms to a functionalist model of mind. 
2. Functionalist models of mind assert that the essence of the human 
person is a set of causal, functional relationships requiring a — but 
not a particular — substrate; this is residual dualism. 
3. Residual dualism is inconsistent with the biblical conception of the 
essence of the human person. 
Therefore, 
4. The character Data does not conform to the biblical conception of 
the essence of the human person. 
So described and organized, Lillegard's case avoids a number of 
Sennett's criticisms without betraying its own character in the least. 
Particularly odd in Sennett's description of (3) is the reference to mate-
rialism; Lillegard only argues that the biblical view contradicts dualism 
of all kinds (including residual dualism), not that it affirms a materialist 
theory of mind. Otherwise, however, Lillegard does leave his argument 
prone to being summarized in the way that Sennett does. It is one of 
those cases where the critic might have done well to look with more 
generosity for the strongest case to criticize, rather than settling for the 
case most forthrightly (albeit imprecisely) stated. 
The disagreement between Lillegard and Sennett over (1) stems from 
Sennett's narrower, and Lillegard's broader, definition of functionalist 
theories of mind. On the definition of functionalism Lillegard probably 
ought to have given, and seems most often to intend (the black box func-
tionalism defined above), Sennett's claim that an analog connectionist 
system is not a functionalist system does not hold. Moreover, Sennett 
seems willing to grant (2), at least as stated here, so the remaining 
contention hovers around (3). 
I failed to detect in Lillegard's article the ghost of Sartre or his ilk 
that, evidently, Sennett thought was haunting its pages, though I could 
appreciate how certain of Lillegard's phrases might suggest such a read-
ing. I wonder, therefore, whether Sennett was hasty to suppose that 
Lillegard rejects the conception of a resurrected body. Lillegard seems 
far more open-ended on the question — somewhat agnostic, perhaps. At 
stake here, of course, is whether residual dualism is such a bugbear: if 
you experience continuity of identity between your current body and 
your resurrected body, isn't that a kind of transfer of your essential be-
ing from one substrate to another, à la residual dualism? Sennett says 
yes, and so denies (3). Lillegard seems to want to say no, though not 
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because of a rejection of the resurrection so much as because of an im-
plicit conviction that this change would not really be a new substrate, 
but only a transformed one. But Lillegard's article, unfortunately, is not 
completely clear on this point. 
Anyway, if Lillegard is right that the essence of a human person can 
never be transferred between different substrates, then he makes his 
case: Data would not conform to the biblical conception of the essence of 
the human person. That does not mean much with regard to Data, how-
ever, since the Bible's conception of the essence of the human person 
itself needs to be evaluated for its adequacy, an inquiry that Lillegard 
does not undertake in his article. Similarly, if Sennett is correct that 
Christian doctrine calls for moving the essence of a human person 
among various substrates, then Lillegard's inference to (4) fails. But (4) 
might still be true; it might simply need to be established differently. 
Sennett's summary of Lillegard's argument does not recognize 
clearly enough that it is two-pronged. Lillegard's second (more com-
pressed and more complex) line of argument is somewhat ethical in 
character. It hinges on "parochiality" — the concrete, personally con-
textualized "feel" of psychological predicates like fear and love — and 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. The character Data conforms to a functionalist model of mind. 
2. Functionalist models of mind are formally neutral to the question 
of the parochiality of psychological predicates. 
3. Formal neutrality to the question of the parochiality of psycholog-
ical predicates makes impossible valid human self-identification 
and self-description. 
4. Failure to maintain the conditions for valid human self-
identification and self-description is a betrayal of the moral 
essence of the human person. 
Therefore, 
5. The character Data conforms to a model of mind that, if applied 
to human beings, would be a betrayal of the moral essence of the 
human person. 
It may be because Lillegard relies on this second argument that he feels 
no need to press the adequacy of the biblical conception of the essence 
of the human person, which was the missing last step of his first argu-
ment. Sennett does not adequately address this second argument, but it 
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is a much trickier case to make than the first, which Sennett discusses 
at length. 
In concluding, note that an argument considered by neither pro-
tagonist throws the issues surrounding this debate into a slightly 
different — and, to my mind, a helpful — light. Bypassing Commander 
Data for now, the steps in the argument are as follows: 
1. Being a person requires the capacity for moral choice (this is 
uncontroversial on any sound definition of person). 
2. Moral choice requires consciousness (again, fairly unproblematic; 
in fact, self-consciousness may be required for moral deliberation, 
which is a stronger claim). 
3. Consciousness requires a complex biological system, such as one 
with a central nervous system, and an intricately organized brain. 
I think (1) and (2) are stable enough propositions that this argument 
helpfully draws attention to (3) as being close to the heart of the debate 
in which Lillegard and Sennett are engaged. 
The upshot is, of course, that the conditions necessary for conscious-
ness are thereby (some of the) requirements for being a human person. 
If consciousness is a property exclusively of biological systems, then no 
matter how good nonbiological androids get at simulating human be-
havior, they will never be conscious, nor persons in the ordinary moral 
sense. If consciousness is potentially also the property of other kinds 
of complex systems, such as positronic brains, then positronic brain an-
droids may well have to be acknowledged one day as exercising moral 
choice, and perhaps being persons. Precisely what can be a substrate for 
consciousness is partly a question for cognitive science and biochem-
istry, though the question is infamous for being almost impossible even 
to frame in these spheres of research. 
In an era in which some cognitive psychologists write books with 
"consciousness" in the title but little or nothing about consciousness be-
tween the covers, it might be politically incorrect to think about Data 
(or ourselves) in these terms — though people not familiar with cog-
nitive psychology may wonder what the fuss is about. Consciousness, 
however, cannot be marginalized in these debates, even if it is difficult 
to handle. The price to be paid for such self-deception is the devastating 
consequence that Lillegard warns us against: losing track of something 
essential about ourselves. 
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